

## Prologue : Global Justice and Citizen

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The discourses on global justice import how we might reasonably and peacefully live together in a just world. Plato suggested that our idea of the state should be based upon our idea of justice, for without justice how can we have the 'good society' or the 'good life'? What was once relevant to the polis, to which Plato spoke, may now be relevant to the emergent 'global cosmopolis'(Gills, 2008: 1). The new idea of global age is becoming our real world's concept as a good world and global justice frame gradually. We are all polis and cosmopolis citizen at the same time in a global era.

As a consequence of migration and processes of European unification (multicultural societies and European citizenship), one finds a strong cultural and political pressure even in so called nation state toward a disentanglement of ethnicity, culture, and nationhood from citizenship(Bader, 1995: 212). Migration has a multiple dimension. Classifications of migrants include resident aliens, inhabitant settlers, refugees, students, engineers, and their families. Main causes of migration focus on redistribution of global resources and aim of decent life. Global justice begins with an idea of an decent life to which every person in the world has a human dignity.

The ideal of global justice is meant to mitigate inequalities that could be inherited due to redistributions of resource, wealth, and opportunity. There are two opposed views as to the appropriate domain of principles of distributive justice, statism and cosmopolitanism. The former view, distributive justice is an exclusively domestic idea, regulating social economic inequalities within states or societies. Global justice is realized as a conjunction of internally just states that cooperate on the basis of a conception of international justice which includes principles of nonaggression or fidelity to contract and perhaps also a duty of mutual aid, but no principles of distributive justice. The latter view, principles of distributive justice apply irrespective of national borders directly and primary to the global community of world citizens at large, the aim being that each citizen receives his or her due share of global wealth as determined by a global conception of justice.

A scheme of global social justice appropriate from a liberal point of view will have a

two-tier structure, distinguishing between domestic and global justice. Distributive statism and cosmopolitanism implicitly share one basic assumption. It is the idea that the elementary level of identifying first principles of distributive justice, there can be only one basic domain of application, which, then, is taken to be either the state or the world community. Thus, there seems to be an alternative to both views: a model with a two-tier structure that comprises principles of both domestic and global - or rather the intersocietal - distributive justice. In such a model the principles regulating the domestic and the global distribution of wealth, respectively, need not be the same(Hinsch, 2001: 58-59). Global justice refers to worldwide principles on redistribution and citizenship.

A decent life requires freedoms, resources, opportunities and particular relationships with others, including one's fellow citizens. The idea of a decent life is a comparative notion so that person A's life may be less decent just because person B enjoys more resources, opportunities and so on. Therefore, in order to effect the right to a decent life of peoples living in the world's poorer states, rich states need to redistributive resources and opportunities towards them(Seglow, 2005: 329). In *The Law of Peoples* Rawls says about the duty of assistance and affinity via the realistic utopia argument. This is implicit in that global redistribution in conformity with the Difference Principle, the argument says, cannot be part of a realistic utopia, because the moral psychology of normal human beings, as we know it, would not allow development of a sense of international justice strong enough to support a scheme of global redistribution that maximizes the collective wealth of the least advantaged people(Hinsch, 2001: 70). Though it is to be skeptical because a worldwide sense of fellowship is widely lacking, and emotional ties between distant peoples on the globe are weak, as a matter of fact, global institutions will become stronger as international cooperation and communication increase, which in turn will gradually strengthen our emotional ties with peoples in other parts of the world.

Hinsch and Carens have reconstructed Rawls's(1971) argument to show that one should understand the original position globally: the difference principle, require global redistribution of resources and rewards. Global difference principle? If the representatives are "ignorant of talents, they would select principles in which inequalities of distribution that derive from differential talents and abilities are "to the maximum benefit of the least advantaged over the course of their life" and so they would choose the difference principle(Brock, 2005: 3-4). According to cosmopolitanism, the demands of justice derive from an equal concern or a duty of fairness that we owe in principle to all our fellow human beings, then, if one takes the cosmopolitan view, the existence of separate sovereign states is an unfortunate obstacle to the establishment of global justice. But it would be morally inconsistent with the world that could attempt to realize the same standards of fairness or equal opportunity that one wants

for one's own society. The accident of being born in a poor rather than a rich country is as arbitrary a determinant of one's fate as the accident of being born into a poor rather than a rich family in the same country(Nagel, 2005: 119).

Regardless of class or origin, persons should have the same chance of attaining a favored social position, given the same talents and willingness to try(Rawls, 1999: 63). This sentence can be applied at a global equality of opportunity. Persons should have the same opportunity to achieve a position, independently of what nation or state or class or religion or ethnic group they belong to(Caney, 2001: 114). It is unfair if a person enjoys worse chances in life because of class or social status or ethnicity. This deep conviction implies, however, that we should also object if some people have worse opportunities because of their nationality or civic identity. The core intuition, then, maintains that persons should not face worse opportunities in life because of the community or communities they come from(Caney, 2001: 115).

The egalitarian principle of equal liberties serves as a criterion of radical critique of all ascriptive privileges. Citizenship laws combine, in different ways, criteria of birth or descent(jus sanguinis) and territory (jus soli). These ascriptive criteria are morally no more defensible than all the other, like kinship, sex, age, region, residence, language, habits, culture, lifestyles, gender, religion, nationhood, social class, membership in churches, parties, and so on(Bader, 1995: 214). Notwithstanding the global difference principle and the global equality of opportunity by cosmopolitans, the exclusionary citizenship have been widely ignored in the dominant theories of justice by political realists. This is not unfair. Global justice, not charity or mutual aid, asks for fairly open borders.

In this point, concept and theories of global justice are in the early stages of formation, and it is not clear what the main questions are, let alone the main possible answers. The argument about global justice presents political theory with its most important current task, and even perhaps with the opportunity to make a practical contribution in the long run(Nagel, 2005: 113). Citizens - especially citizens in rich states - have powerful duties to help build a just global order, one in which all persons are able to lead decent lives. Once achieved, this need not include completely open borders, although there are good reasons - not least to encourage the spread of cosmopolitan sentiment - for borders to be more open than they currently are. Until we realize that ideal, and perhaps even if we do, rich states have substantial duties to admit poor outsiders(Seglow, 2005: 329). Immigrants as cosmopolitan citizens must have a strong and basic rights to domestic citizenship according to global equality of opportunity, difference principle, and egalitarian democracy. This is a point of departure for just world.

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